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This article provides a historical overview of the factors leading up to debt
crises and the default mechanisms used by governments to solve them,
ranging from repudiation and restructuring to inflation tax and financial
repression. The paper also analyses the Spanish governments’ graduation to
responsible public debt management under democracy and the last debt
crisis starting in 2010. After analysing the evolution of the outstanding public
debt, budget deficits, the Spanish economy’s ability to borrow, the central
government’s debt affordability and the profile of public debt, the article
concludes that the Spanish case confirms the main hypotheses of concerning
international debt crises: short-term borrowing enhanced the risk of a debt
crisis; insolvency problems arose when governments were unwilling or
unable to repay debt; debt crises took place after large capital inflows; most
outright defaults ended up being partial defaults; public debt level became
unsustainable when it rose above 60-90 per cent of GDP; default trough
inflation became commonplace when fiat money displaced coinage; financial
repression was used as a subtle type of debt restructuring; and defaults
endangered the creditworthiness of the Spanish Finance Ministry and forced
disciplined fiscal policies.
Keywords: public debt, default, restructuring, inflation tax, financial
repression, fiscal policy
JEL Code: E31, E4, E6, F3, F4, H6, N10, N23, N43, H63, F34
* Received 13 May 2012. Accepted 6 September 2012. I am very grateful to Pablo Martı´n-Acen˜a,
Elena Martı´nez and Marı´a A´ngeles Pons for inviting me to deliver this paper to the two conferences
they organised on financial crises at the Pablo de Olavide University in Carmona (Seville) and at the
Fundacio´n Areces in Madrid and for their helpful comments. I would also like to thank the parti-
cipants at these conferences for their useful suggestions and comments, especially Gerardo della
Paollera. Finally, I wish to thank Leandro Prados de la Escosura, Andre´s Hoyo, Javier Moreno and
Joaquı´n Cuevas for data and valuable suggestions.
a Francisco Comı´n, Departamento de Fundamentos de Economı´a e Historia Econo´mica, Uni-
versidad de Alcala´, Facultad de Ciencias Econo´micas y Empresariales, Plaza de la Victoria 3, 28802
Alcala´ de Henares, Madrid, Spain. francisco.comin@uah.es
Revista de Historia Econo´mica, Journal of lberian and Latin American Economic History
Vol. 30, No. 3: 353-390. doi:10.1017/S0212610912000134 & Instituto Figuerola, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 2012.
353
RESUMEN
Este artı´culo proporciona una visio´n histo´rica de los factores que
crearon las crisis de la deuda y de los me´todos utilizados por los gobiernos
para resolverlas: el repudio, la restructuracio´n,el impuesto inflacionista
y la represio´n financiera. Tambie´n analiza la graduacio´n de los gobiernos
espan˜oles en la gestio´n responsable de la deuda pu´blica en la democracia.Se
analiza la evolucio´n de la deuda pu´blica en circulacio´n, los de´ficits pre-
supuestarios, la capacidad endeudamiento de la economı´a espan˜ola y del
gobierno, ası´ como el perfil de la deuda soberana. El artı´culo concluye que
el caso espan˜ol confirma las hipo´tesis principales sobre las crisis inter-
nacionales la deuda con respecto a: los pre´stamos a corto plazo aumentaban
el riesgo de las crisis de la deuda; los impagos ocurrieron cuando los
gobiernos no quisieron o no pudieron pagar la deuda;las crisis de la deuda
tuvieron lugar despue´s de grandes entradas de capital extranjero; las ban-
carrotas acabaron convirtie´ndose en restructuraciones; la deuda soberana
se hizo insostenible cuando supero´ el 60-90% del PIB; la inflacio´n se
convirtio´ en la forma general de impago cuando el dinero fiduciario desplazo´
a las monedas meta´licas; la represio´n financiera se utilizo´ como la forma
ma´s sutil de restructuracio´n de la deuda; los impagos hicieron peligrar
la solvencia de del Ministerio de Hacienda y obligaron a realizar polı´ticas
fiscales restrictivas.
Palabras clave: deuda pu´blica, impago, restructuracio´n, impuesto
inflacionista, represio´n financiera, polı´tica fiscal
1. INTRODUCTION
Public debt crises occurred when public liabilities surpassed the State’s
ability to meet the debt burden following a period of funding budget deficits
through public borrowing. Public debt could not be serviced or refinanced
(because creditors believed they would not be repaid) and the government
defaulted. In order to identify Spain’s debt crises in the 19th and 20th cen-
turies, we will commence by analysing the evolution of outstanding public
debt, budget deficits, the Spanish economy’s ability to borrow, the central
government’s debt affordability (and debt sustainability) and the profile
of public debt (the weight of both short-term and external debt). In the
following sections, due to the fact that the default mechanisms used by
governments to resolve debt crises changed, we study the phases of the
history of Spanish public debt. We focus on the episodes of default and
rescheduling. When they could not meet interest payments, roll over or pay
off the debt, governments declared a default that could be total (repudiation),
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or partial (restructuring). Reneging on public debt obligation was outright
default. Debt rescheduling was partial default and involved reducing interest
rates and/or principal, and extending debt maturity.
In the third section, we study the debt crisis inherited from the Ancien
Regime and concentrate on Fernando VII’s debt repudiations and the debt
restructurings that Liberal governments carried out up to 1876, including
those by the Finance Ministers Bravo Murillo, Garcı´a Barzanallana and
Salaverrı´a. In the episodes of debt repudiations, the Monarch either did not
recognise the existing debt or unilaterally stopped paying the interest.
Spanish governments reneged on public debt either because of the change of
political regime (absolutist restorations) or when the government was highly
indebted and debt burdens became unsustainable. The debt restructurings of
this phase were actually covert repudiations as they had been decided upon
unilaterally by governments and imposed on the bondholders. These cases of
debt rescheduling implied reducing face value, nominal interest rates or net
yields and extending maturity.
In the fourth section, we analyse debt crises in Spain between 1880
and 1975. At the end of the 19th century, restructurings of the external
debt were voluntary and agreed upon with foreign investors, while in the
20th century, the prevalence of internal debt allowed governments to both
carry out debt restructurings and also use inflation tax. Consequently, in
the three first paragraphs we study Camacho’s arranged, voluntary debt
restructuring, Ferna´ndez Villaverde’s debt rescheduling and the debt
consolidations that took place in the interwar period. In the fourth
paragraph, we examine how governments turned to currency debasement
and inflation tax as a means to expedite repudiation of domestic debt.
This mechanism of currency debasement had been used since the First
World War and, in particular, during the Franco Regime. Inflation tax
solved debt crisis because inflation reduced the real value of the existing
stock of debt and of its service burden. The Franco Regime also resorted
to financial repression in order to finance budget deficits and extra-budget
public investments in privileged conditions (out of the market). Financial
repression was used in Spain to expand domestic debt markets. Thanks to
the obligatory investment coefficients banks and savings banks had to
lend large amounts of their assets to the general government and state-
owned firms. Thereby Franco’s finance ministers enjoyed lower interest
rates than on the capital market and citizens were forced to hold low
interest bank accounts.
Finally, in the fifth section, we analyse the Spanish governments’ graduation
to responsible public debt management under democracy. In the first para-
graph, we focus on the transition from repudiation methods during the Franco
Regime (printing money by the Bank of Spain and financial repression) to the
democratic governments’ fiscal responsibility. This graduation from being a
serial defaulter was boosted by the financial commitments adopted when Spain
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became a member of the European Union (1986). In the second paragraph,
we study how this fiscal responsibility did not prevent Spain from suffering a
new debt crisis created by the economic recession and the contagion of the
Greek debt crisis in 2010.
2. A SECULAR EVOLUTION OF DEBT, INFLATION, DEFICITS,
DEFAULTS AND THE BURDEN OF THE DEBT SERVICE: THE
DEBT CRISIS INDICATORS
In order to identify public debt crises and to estimate the consequences of
defaults, we will analyse the following series: (1) the level of real public debt,
(2) the budget deficit/GDP ratio, (3) the ratio of public debt to GDP, (4) the
debt affordability or debt burden — which is the percentage of debt service in
total budget expenditures — and (5) the percentage of external and short-
term debt in total outstanding public debt.
2.1. The level of real public debt: covert repudiation caused by
inflation
Until 1983, outstanding public debt (central government debt), in real
terms of pesetas of 1913 (Figure 1), did not surpass 20,000 million. After that,
real public debt skyrocketed to 124,626 million pesetas in 1999. Before 1983
(see Figure 2), the peaks of real public debt (1878, 1902, 1935 and 1973),
which identify the main debt crises in modern Spain can be seen clearly. The
peaks of existing public debt before 1983 were around 14,000 million pesetas
of 1913. We must include the severe debt crisis prior to 1850 that is not
reflected in the figure.
Spain exited these debt crises by reducing the stock of public debt by
resorting both to debt restructurings and to inflation tax. First, after
the Bravo Murillo debt rescheduling, the level of public debt was brought
down between 1850 and 1855. After having been at a standstill for a decade,
public debt grew notably between 1864 and 1878, thereby generating another
debt crisis. Real public debt fell from this ceiling to a low in 1886. The
greatest reduction occurred in 1882 and 1883, thanks to the Camacho debt
restructuring.
Second, between 1886 and 1901, outstanding public debt grew, especially
between 1898 and 1901, as a consequence of waging the colonial war in
Cuba. This new debt crisis was resolved thanks to Ferna´ndez Villaverde’s
fiscal consolidation, which restructured the debt and obtained budget surpluses
that allowed for paying back part of the outstanding Treasury bonds. Thanks to
this measure, existing public debt fell between 1902 and 1904. Between 1909
and 1920, the real stock of debt dropped sharply thanks to the inflation
process generated by the budget deficits that were monetised (Figure 3).
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At the beginning of the 20th century, by reducing the debt’s real value,
Spanish governments exhausted domestic bondholders. Annuitant euthana-
sia also occurred in Spain.
Third, real public debt grew rapidly between 1920 and 1935 because of
budget deficits mainly caused until 1925, by the war in Morocco. During the
Civil War, public debt increased for both the republican government as well as
for Franco’s army funding. War funding was carried out by the respective Banks
of Spain (the national bank and the republican bank), so there were no public
debt issues to finance the Civil War, although Franco did receive loans from
other fascist governments (Comı´n 2008; Comı´n and Lo´pez 2008; Martorell and
ComU´n 2008). Real public debt fell between 1940 and 1951 in the post-war
period. This fall was initially influenced by Larraz’s debt rescheduling; however,
the descent of the level of real public debt after 1944 was caused by a highly
inflationist process (Figure 3). Franco honoured the foreign debt Hitler and
Mussolini had provided but hurt holders of domestic debt on the national side,
and defaulted on the republican liabilities issued during the war.
FIGURE 1
REAL PUBLIC DEBT (MILLION PESETAS OF 1913) (1850-2000)
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Fourth, real public debt stalled between 1952 and 1965 only to increase
later until 1973. Subsequently, deficit monetisation and inflation reduced the
real value of public debt. For a second time, Franco hurt those who had
financed budget deficits with another partial default caused by inflation
(Figure 3). Finally, budget deficits during the transition to democracy
increased real public debt until the 2008 public debt crisis.
The inflationary tax acted when the inflation rate exceeded 5 per cent for a
certain period of time, according to Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). This only
happened in the 20th century (Figure 3). First, during the First World War,
the inflation rate almost reached 15 per cent, when the monetary supply
yearly rate of growth hit 21 per cent. Second, between the Civil War and
1992, the inflation rate exceeded 5 per cent, except for the years after the
Stabilisation Plan (1960-1961). The inflation rate was particularly high
(above 10 per cent) during the autarchy period (1939-1958) and the transi-
tion to democracy (1973-1984), as was the case of the rate of growth of the
monetary supply. Inflationary tax, therefore, was used extensively during the
FIGURE 2
REAL PUBLIC DEBT (MILLION PESETAS OF 1913) (1850-1982)
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Franco regime and the transition to democracy, before joining the European
Union1. These high and persistent inflation rates reduced the real value of
outstanding public debt (Figure 1).
The inflationary tax also eroded the real value of government bond yields.
It is virtually impossible to calculate the average nominal interest rate of
public debt over two centuries, given the variety of securities. To solve this
problem the official interest rate on loans from the Bank of Spain to private
banks against the collateral of public debt is used as a proxy. As shown in
Figure 4, through the 19th century real debt interest rates were rarely nega-
tive, while in the 20th century negative interest rates predominated in two
periods: during the First World War (1915-1920) and between 1936 and
1984. In fact, during the Franco regime the years when real interest rates on
public debt were positive were exceptional, despite the growth of nominal
interest rates above 5 per cent between 1966 and 1998; in the 1977-1993
FIGURE 3
INFLATION RATE AND M2 (PERCENTAGE RATE OF GROWTH MOVING
AVERAGES THREE YEARS)
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1 Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) point out that in emerging markets and in some advanced
economies, there is a positive relationship between increases in inflation and those in public debt.
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period, nominal interest rates even reached 10 per cent. As of 1985, the
responsible management of public debt and the control of inflation made it
possible for real interest rates to become positive again.
2.2. The origin of public debt crises: budget deficits
The origin of public debt crises was to be found in the large budget
deficits. Figure 5 shows that Spain’s debt crises arose when the state’s budget
deficit neared 6 per cent of GDP. First, after the Bienio Progresista (1854-
1855), the budget balance reached a trough at 21.2 per cent of GDP in 1856.
This level was insufficient to unleash a debt crisis. Second, the deficit levels
(5.6 per cent in 1870) reached during the Sexenio Democra´tico (1868-1874)
and the 10 years’ war in Cuba (1868-1878) triggered a debt crisis that was
solved through defaulting on debt interest payments, which reduced the
budget deficit in the 1870s.
Third, budget deficits were small up to 1892 (a trough of 1.3 per cent of
GDP in 1888), and they did not bring about debt crises. On the contrary, the
FIGURE 4
INTEREST RATES ON THE BANK OF SPAIN’S LOANS AGAINST PUBLIC DEBT AS
COLLATERAL (1874-2010)
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large budget deficits generated by the war in Cuba (Spanish War, 1895-1898:
4 per cent of GDP) generated a new public debt crisis in Spain. Fourth, after
the 1903-1911 balanced budget period, public deficits reached 5 per cent of
GDP, during the period 1915-1921, partially caused by the war in Morocco,
triggering another public debt crisis.
Fifth, budget deficits during the Civil War resulted in the post-Civil War
public debt crisis. After the Franco regime paid the arrears of the war, budget
deficits were infrequent and small (1.3 per cent of GDP in 1959 and 1.1 per cent
in 1971). Apparently, there were neither fiscal crises nor explicit public debt
crises under the dictatorship because Franco’s governments resorted to two
other unorthodox methods of public debt default: financial repression and
inflation tax (see Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). First of all, during the dicta-
torship, banks and savings banks had to finance the economic growth policy
directly as well as the social and education policies, which prevented
increases in public spending and budget deficits (Martı´n-Acen˜a and Comı´n
1991; Comı´n 2007). Second, Franco resorted to inflation tax to liquidate
FIGURE 5
GOVERNMENT BUDGET BALANCE TO GDP (PERCENTAGES) (1850-2013)
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his debts. Those who held bank deposits, bank notes and public debt were
the losers of this unorthodox financial policy during the dictatorship.
Sixth, through the democratic period there were two debt crises whose
origin can be found in budget deficits: the first debt crisis took place during
the transition to democracy period up to 1985 and the second was in the
economic recession of 1993 and 1994. Under democracy, the central gov-
ernment’s budget deficit surpassed 2.0 per cent of GDP during the 1978-1997
period, reaching its ceiling in 1985 (5.8 per cent of GDP) and in 1993 (5.7 per
cent). The debt crisis of 1993-1994 was resolved in an orthodox manner
thanks to the policy of monetary convergence on the way to the establish-
ment of the euro. The central government’s budget deficits diminished from
1994 onwards until reaching budgetary balance in 2000. The general gov-
ernment’s budget deficit was reduced from 6.5 per cent of GDP in 1993 until
reaching a budget surplus of 1.9 per cent in 2007. Seventh, nonetheless, the
great recession increased general government’s budget deficit to 4.2 per cent
in 2008 and to 11.1 per cent in 2009. Although the government took its time
to react, the change in economic policy in May 2010, after the contagion by
the Greek debt crisis, allowed for a budget deficit reduction to 9.2 per cent of
GDP. The European commission estimated that Spain would fail to reduce
its budget deficit, which would reach 6.4 of GDP in 2013.
2.3. The Spanish economy’s ability to sustain its public debt
According to Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), public debt becomes unsustain-
able when it reaches 60-90 per cent of GDP2. The level of tolerable public debt
depends on several factors: the existing level of debt, the current public budget
position, interest rate levels, the debt maturity profile, the weight of external and
short-term debt and the ability of the government to generate additional tax
revenues, which depends on the features of the tax system and the actual and
expected rate of economic growth. The public debt/GDP ratio (Figure 6) shows
the cycles of the Spanish economy’s ability to make debt payments.
The first cycle covers the period from Bravo Murillo’s restructuring to that
of Camacho. In its first phase, between 1850 and 1863, the public debt to
GDP ratio dropped from 91.7 per cent to 58.5 per cent. In its second phase,
from 1864, public debt increased to 168.9 per cent of GDP in 1876. Between
1868 and Camacho’s debt restructuring in 1882, Spain was a highly indebted
country (debt/GDP ratio higher than 100 per cent) and the public debt
became unsustainable. The debt crisis was solved by the rescheduling
implemented by Finance Minister Camacho. This restructuring brought
outstanding public debt down to 69.9 per cent of GDP in 1886.
2 Actually, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) point out that the threshold of public debt intolerance
«depends heavily on a country’s record of default and inflation». Reinhart et al. (2012) characterise «major
public debt overhang episodes» by «public debt to GDP levels exceeding 90% for at least five years».
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The second cycle covers the period between 1890 and 1920. Once the
effects of Camacho’s rescheduling had passed, public debt increased once
again reaching 127.9 per cent of GDP in 1902. Between 1896 and 1909, the
debt/GDP ratio surpassed 90 per cent, a percentage that indicates both an
unsustainable public debt and a high probability of default. This debt crisis
was solved by fiscal consolidation, debt restructuring and inflation tax. Fer-
na´ndez Villaverde’s 1899 fiscal austerity and debt restructuring together with
the inflation tax introduced following the First World War reduced the public
debt/GDP ratio to 44.4 per cent in 1920. During the interwar period there was
no public debt crisis since the debt/GDP ratio never rose above 67.6 per cent
(the figure reached in 1933). Therefore, public debt was tolerable during the
Great Depression in Spain just as there was no banking crisis (Comı´n 1988,
2011; Martı´n-Acen˜a 2004).
The third cycle covers the period of Franco’s regime. In 1940, central
government debt was 71.8 per cent of the GDP. This low percentage, after
having waged a Civil War, can be explained by the fact that both armies had
borrowed from the Bank of Spain and, in the case of Franco, from other
FIGURE 6
GOVERNMENT DEBT/GDP RATIO (PERCENTAGES) (1850-2013)
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fascist governments too. These borrowings did not involve the issue of
securities of public debt. On top of that Franco repudiated the liabilities
issued by the republican government during the Civil War, including bills
(Martı´n-Acen˜a 2004). Neither of the armies issued public debt because
budget deficit was monetised. Monetary financing through currency issuance
by the Bank of Spain initiated a powerful inflationary process, which
reduced the real value of the public debt, as we have seen. The absence of
bond issues during the Franco regime and the economic growth of the 1950s
and 1960s reduced the public debt/GDP ratio to 8.2 per cent in 1976. During
the Franco regime there was no formal public debt crisis.
The fourth historical public debt cycle took place under democracy. The
public debt/GDP ratio grew from 13.4 per cent to 60.5 per cent of GDP between
1983 and 1996. These percentages were sustainable and ruled out any formal
public debt crisis during the democratic period, despite the 1992-1993 fiscal
crises when the debt/GDP ratio increased from 41 per cent to 52 per cent in
1993. Afterwards, the general government’s debt to GDP ratio decreased from
67.4 per cent to 36.1 per cent between 1996 and 2007. When the international
financial crisis broke out in 2007 there was no public debt crisis in Spain. Quite
the contrary, the solvency of Spain’s Treasury was outstanding. Nevertheless,
after 2008, the existing stock of public debt reached 60.1 per cent of GDP in
2010. The level of public debt was tolerable since Spain almost met the criteria
of the Growth and Stability Pact of the Eurozone. Despite this, the Kingdom of
Spain’s risk premium increased due to the contagion of the debt crisis in other
peripheral European countries. The reason for this was that the level of debt
tolerance of European countries (including Spain and Italy) was reduced due to
the political conflicts unleashed between Eurozone countries, market specula-
tion against the euro and the depressing economic growth perspectives of
Europe and Spain. This explains the fact that the public debt/GDP ratio will
reach 87.0 per cent in 2013, according to European Commission estimates.
2.4. Debt affordability: the ability of government to service its debt
The question here is whether public debt can be serviced by the govern-
ment. Debt burden (the percentage of debt servicing in total budget spend-
ing) is also known as debt affordability and shows whether the Treasury can
afford its debt burden (Figure 7). The historical cycles revealed by the evo-
lution of debt affordability coincide with those previously analysed. Reinhart
and Rogoff (2009) pointed out that there were five large default cycles in the
world; periods when many countries suffered profound foreign debt crises3.
3 The first international debt crisis cycle occurred during the Napoleonic wars. The second
cycle took place between 1820 and 1840 when half of the countries in the world defaulted (among
them, all of the recently created Latin American countries). The third cycle started around 1870 and
lasted for two decades. The fourth international foreign debt crisis cycle started with the Great
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Spain shared the severe global debt crises, with the exception of the inter-
national debt crisis cycle of 1930-1950.
First cycle: After Bravo Murillo’s debt restructuring, the debt burden/
public spending ratio grew from 11.6 per cent to 52.6 per cent between 1850
and 1870. The public debt burden became unsustainable generating a debt
crisis that led to a default on debt interest payments, which explains the fact
that in 1874-1875 debt servicing fell to 12.5 per cent of budget expenditures.
After the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy, debt interest had been
paid out partially since 1876, and debt servicing grew from 29.7 per cent of
budget spending to 38.4 per cent in 1879. Once again, the public debt level
became unsustainable and the State could not service such large amounts of
debt interests and repayments. The gap between debt servicing and interest
FIGURE 7
DEBT SERVICING/BUDGET SPENDING RATIO (PERCENTAGES)
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(F’note continued)
Depression and lasted until the beginning of the 1950s. The fifth cycle of debt default includes the
debt crisis of the 1980s and 1990s. Virtually no country experienced a debt crisis in the period 2003-
2008. The only precedent for this debt quietness was the two-decade period that preceded the First
World War when the gold standard was in effect. We must add a sixth period to Reinhart and
Rogoff’s periodisation; one that affects the debt crisis that was sparked in peripheral Europe in
2010. See Figure 5.1 by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).
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payments on the debt grew when the share of short-term debt increased
(Figures 7 and 8).
Second cycle: Camacho’s restructuring reduced the debt servicing/budget
expenditure ratio to 27.3 per cent in 1882. This debt rescheduling avoided the
risk of insolvency of the Treasury but it did not solve the Spanish debt
problems because debt servicing continued to be unaffordable. In fact the
debt burden continued to grow reaching 40.1 per cent of public spending in
1894. The percentage drop in 1895 was due to the remarkable increase in
budget spending to finance the Spanish War in Cuba and the Philippines by
issuing colonial debts. When Spain lost the war with the United States in
1898, the Spanish government had to assume those colonial debts as stipu-
lated in the Treaty of Paris, which skyrocketed debt servicing to 46 per cent
of budget expenditures in 1903. The fiscal consolidation policy and Ferna´ndez
Villaverde’s debt restructuring reduced the debt servicing/public spending ratio
to 28.4 per cent in 1914. The budget deficits during the First World Ward
pushed this ratio to another peak of 48.6 per cent in 1917, making the debt
FIGURE 8
STRUCTURE OF PUBLIC DEBT (PERCENTAGES) (1850-2001)
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burden unaffordable once again. The inflation tax and public debt consolida-
tions of Alba (1917) and La Cierva (1919) all helped reduce debt burden on
budget spending to 20.1 per cent in 1920.
Third cycle: During the interwar period the debt servicing/budget expenses
ratio decreased from 28.1 per cent in 1923 to 21.4 per cent in 1932, due
mainly to Calvo Sotelo’s debt consolidation (1927). These high percentages
show that there were fiscal problems in this period. Nonetheless, as we
have seen, public debt was affordable and there was no threat of an explicit
debt crisis.
Fourth cycle: The debt burden was tolerable during the Franco regime.
Between 1941 and 1975, the State could afford to service its debt, which fell
from 19.4 per cent to 2.3 per cent of budget spending. This ratio confirms
that there was no formal debt crisis in Spain during the dictatorship.
Fifth cycle: During the democratic period debt burden grew from 1.9 per cent
to 47.8 per cent between 1981 and 1997. Consolidation of short-term debt
reduced this ratio to 32.9 per cent in 1999. Thanks to the low levels of public
debt inherited from the Franco regime, the debt servicing/budget spending
ratio oscillated between 10 per cent and 15 per cent in the period 1985-2005.
This percentage was sustainable and did not pose problems for the Ministry
of Finance. The fiscal consolidation policy required when Spain entered the
Monetary Union reduced debt burden, and borrowing costs were only 7.3 per
cent of budget expenditures in 2007-2009. This reveals that the Spanish State
could afford its public debt interest payments at the beginning of the great
recession. The debt burden was tolerable and this indicator does not suggest
the presence of a debt crisis in Spain in 2009. However, the growing public
debt/GDP ratio, public debt interest rates and the proportion of short-term
debt will increase the debt servicing/public spending ratio, making the debt
burden unaffordable once again.
2.5. The profile of public indebtedness during the crisis: external
and short-term debt
Debt crises changed the structure of public debt, reducing external debt
and increasing short-term debt. The subsequent debt restructurings reduced
both external and short-term debt. In the first place, debt crises and resche-
duling tend to reduce the weight of external debt, a situation which was more
important in the 19th than in the 20th century. In Spain, the level of external debt
was high until 1895, surpassing 26.8 per cent of the total (Figure 8).
A debt crisis can explode when a country has resorted to an excess of
external debt (issued in foreign currency), because it can lack sufficient foreign
currency to honour its interests and payments. This was the case of Spain
before 1850 and that which led to the Bravo Murillo rescheduling. After this
covert default, external debt decreased from 40.2 per cent to 18.1 per cent
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between 1850 and 1867. Given that the Bank of Spain refused to grant loans to
the Treasury and that the foreign stock exchanges were closed to the Spanish
securities, Bravo Murillo and the finance ministers who followed resorted, from
1852, to the Caja General de Depo´sitos (General Savings Bank), which siphoned
funds from the savings banks to the Treasury (it was the first use of financial
repression in Spain).
However, during the Six-Year Period, liberal governments once again
resorted heavily to foreign borrowing. In fact, in 1868, Finance Minister
Laureano Figuerola closed down the Caja General de Depo´sitos and
once again the Treasury started issuing external debt, which recovered to
40.4 per cent of the total debt in 1873. Subsequently, the interest payments in
foreign currency of external public debt grew. The debt crisis of the Six-Year
Period and Camacho’s debt rescheduling in 1882, reduced the percentage of
external debt to 28 per cent in 1883. Given that Spain maintained a bime-
tallic standard and that silver coins were depreciating, Camacho decided to
ensure payment of external debt interests in gold. This led to a rapid descent
of the gold reserves, which in 1883 obliged the authorities to suspend the
convertibility of the peseta to gold. At this point, Spaniards started buying
Spanish external debt because this ensured higher yields given that the
interest was paid in gold, in Paris. In the future, this would allow the Finance
Minister Ferna´ndez Villaverde to carry out a default of the external debt
owed by Spanish citizens.
In fact, the debt crisis brought about by the war in Cuba and the demands
that the affidavit of Ferna´ndez Villaverde’s rescheduling made on those
Spaniards who had external debt, reduced its relevance from 26.7 per cent to
8.2 per cent between 1895 and 1903. The greater weight of the domestic debt
allowed governments to implement inflation tax thereafter. When Villaverde
restructured the debt in 1900, he demanded that Spanish external bond-
holders sign an affidavit so that their external securities would be legally
converted into domestic debt. This explains the sharp drop of the external
debt in the early years of the 20th century. The current account surpluses
during the First World War made Spanish foreign investments possible.
Spaniards bought external debt in foreign hands that was automatically
transformed into domestic debt. In this way the volume of the external debt
was reduced to only 1.2 per cent of the total in 1921. External public debt
became irrelevant.
During the Civil War, Franco’s army resorted to foreign loans but this is
not reflected in the public debt statistics. Besides, Franco paid off this foreign
debt quickly in the post-war period. The foreign funding of Franco’s army
increased external debt to 6.1 per cent in 1943.
After the 1959 Stabilisation Plan and openness, external debt became
significant again growing from 7.6 per cent in 1960 to 13.3 per cent in 1974.
Nevertheless, it grew even more following the subsequent foreign liberal-
isation carried out by the democratic regime, when external debt reached a
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peak of 36.9 per cent of the total in 1978. Later, external debt fell below
10 per cent of the total, and although the 1990s saw recuperation, the high
levels of the 19th century were never reached again. After a subsequent and
extremely sharp drop due to the debt crisis in the democratic period, the
external debt recovered after Spain became a member of the European
Union, however it was only 7.5 per cent in 2001. External public debt was not
a problem during the 20th century.
In the second place, in contrast, the short-term debt (Treasury bills)
increased during the debt crisis because lenders did not grant long-term
loans to countries with fiscal difficulties given the uncertainty and the risk
this implied. To solve the debt crisis, the restructurings consolidated the
short-term debt, extending the maturity dates of the bills. The high percen-
tage of Treasury bills signals the ensuing debt crises in Spain (Figure 8).
First, between 1868 and 1878, the Treasury’s debt was around 10 per cent of
the existing debt; its volume was reduced to 2 per cent in 1882 thanks to
Camacho’s restructuring. Second, in the period between 1895 and 1903, the
short-term debt reached 29.3 per cent in 1898; the following year, Ferna´ndez
Villaverde restructured the debt, decreasing its importance to 3.6 per cent in
1909. Third, between 1922 and 1926, Spanish governments issued a large
amount of short-term debt reaching 29.6 per cent in 1926; its volume was
reduced to 1.3 per cent in 1928 thanks to Calvo Sotelo’s consolidation of
short-term public debt. Fourth, during the Civil War and the post-civil war
period a large quantity of short-term debt was issued reaching a peak in 1941
(45 per cent of the total). Subsequently, Treasury bills were reduced to 2 per
cent of the total in 1962 thanks to Larraz’s restructuring and the pay off of
the bills. In the fifth place, in the period of the transition to democracy, from
1984 onwards, a large amount of Treasury bills was also issued — making up
61.4 per cent in 1989.
To sum up, Table 1 includes the indicators of the main public debt crises
in Spain during the 19th and 20th centuries. Although no data are available
before 1849, the Spanish government was in permanent default during the
first half of the 19th century. This explains why all indicators of debt crises
show a peak in 1850. Bravo Murillo’s debt rescheduling cut all the series by
24-49 per cent, reaching a low in 1860. The second public debt cycle began in
the period 1861-1873 when budget deficits surpassed 20 per cent of GDP, and
a public debt peak was reached in 1876. The debt reschedulings of Salaverrı´a
and Camacho brought down the level of debt to the low of 1886 (58 per cent)
and the debt burden (71 per cent). The third cycle began with the budget
deficits of 1895-1902 and ended in 1919 due to the Ferna´ndez Villaverde’s
debt rescheduling and the inflationary tax, with reductions of the debt levels
of more than 50 per cent. The fourth cycle occurred during the Franco
regime, when inflationary tax reduced the public debt/GDP ratio by almost
90 per cent between 1940 and 1976 and brought down the real public debt
interest rate to less than 25 per cent.
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TABLE 1
PUBLIC DEBT CRISIS IN SPAIN (1850-2012)
Ratio
Duration
and depth
Bravo
Murillo Camacho
Ferna´ndez Villaverde
and inflationary tax
Inflationary
tax
Inflationary
tax Euro
Outstanding debt/prices Peak-trough 1850-1855 1878-1886 1901-1919 1944-1950 1972-1976 1999-2006
Fall 24% 57% 53% 28% 41% 25%
Outstanding debt/fiscal
revenues
Peak-trough 1849-1860 1878-1886 1901-1921 1940-1976 2002-2006
Fall 48% 60% 55% 89% 29%
Budget deficit/PIB Period 1861-1873 1895-1902 1915-1922 1982-2006
Level 2.8% 3.3% 4.1%
Outstanding debt/PIB Peak-trough 1850-1860 1876-1885 1902-1920 1940-1976 1996-2007
Fall 35% 58% 65% 89% 34%
Debt servicing/fiscal
revenues
Peak-trough 1856-1859 1870-1882 1897-1913 1917-1920 1946-1970 1997-2006
Fall 49% 71% 30% 29% 3% 38%
Real public debt interest
rate
Period 1887-1896 1916-1919 1942-1959 1972-1983
Level ,0 , 25% , 25% ,25%
External public debt/
total debt
Period 1850-1888 1977-1985 2000-2012
Percentage .30% .20% .40%
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TABLE 1 (Cont.)
Floating public debt/
total debt
Period 1896-1901 1923-1926 1940-1955 1984-1988 2009-2011
Percentage .15 .20 .20 .20% .15%
Public debt quotation Period 1850-1881 1882-1899 1900-1915 1916-1944 1944-1978 1979-1985 1996-2009
Percentage .40% .60% .80% .100% .100% .100% .100%
Source: Same source as graphs 1, 5, 6 and 7.
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3. THE DEBT CHAOS INHERITED FROM THE ANCIEN REGIME
In Section 3.1, we will see how the absolutist governments were irres-
ponsible in their management of public debt. In the twilight of the Ancien
Regime, they repudiated previously issued debts and stopped servicing them.
In 1814, Fernando VII reneged on external debt. In 1823, he repudiated
again the external borrowings issued during the Constitutional Triennium
(1820-1823). Moreover, Fernando VII stopped paying the interest on domestic
debts in 1826. In Section 3.2, we will analyse how the first Liberal govern-
ments did not honour public debt either. Despite the fact that the Finance
Minister Count of Toreno restructured the debt in 1834, subsequent Liberal
governments were unable to service external debt. We will also see how
Minister Alejandro Mon consolidated the short-term debt in 1844. In the
fourth section, we will examine the comprehensive debt restructuring carried
out by Bravo Murillo in 1850. This rescheduling triggered the protests of
foreign bondholders and the shutdown of the European stock exchanges to
Spanish securities. This international pressure forced the Spanish government
to rectify and Garcı´a Barzanallana to implement a new debt restructuring
after a pact with foreign bondholders.
3.1. Fernando VII’s defaults (1814-1833)
The absolutist monarch repudiated the loans made previously to the
Spanish Treasury and neglected debt service. On the contrary, the Liberal
governments of the constitutional periods did acknowledge all existing
public securities. This meant a radical difference in fiscal principles between
liberals and absolutists. However, in practice, the liberals could neither pay
interests due nor redeem the debt. The fiscal irresponsibility of the Spanish
Treasury ministers during the first half of the 19th century worsened the
debt crisis inherited from the 18th century. This reduced the State’s cred-
itworthiness and prevented financial revolution in Spain. Consequently, the
Treasury had to continue funding the budget deficits turning to Spanish
financiers who charged high interest rates, increasing borrowing costs. The
large volume of public debt inherited from the Ancien Regime as well as the
irresponsible fiscal management burdened Spanish public finances during
the 19th century (see Comı´n 2004).
The wars against France and England as of 1793 were financed by issuing
public debt (vales reales, royal notes), and with loans from the Bank of
San Carlos, a national bank created specifically to finance the government.
Between 1793 and 1808, the public debt grew from 2019 to 7194 million
reals, which is an amount similar to the cost of financing the wars. The issue
of vales reales with respect to tax revenue was excessive and the government
could not service the royal bonds that were depreciating severely. In 1798, a
sinking fund (Caja de Amortizacio´n) was created to service this debt. It was
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endowed with some earmarked taxes and the resources from the disentailment
of the properties of charities and religious institutions (the desamortizacio´n of
Godoy). Nevertheless, the sinking fund barely paid back the royal bonds (only
340 million reals), because the Monarch allocated the funds from the Caja de
Amortizacio´n to finance the war expenses, thereby breaking his promise to set
them aside for debt redemption. This was the first default (1st) analysed in this
paper (Table 2). Although the Liberal finance ministers of the period 1808-1813
(Cortes de Ca´diz) tried, they were not able to solve the debt crisis because they
had to finance the War of Independence against Napoleon. War expenditures
increased the face value of the existing bonds to 11,313 million reals in 1813.
The Spanish governments in Ca´diz could not honour the public debt
(2nd default). Canga Argu¨elles’ debt restructuring plan, during the Courts of Ca´diz,
again followed the principle of the sinking fund and tried to resort to disentail-
ment to boost Treasury revenues. It was not possible to carry out the plan but it
marked the guidelines for later attempts to resolve the debt crisis in Spain.
In 1814, Fernando VII re-established absolutism and repudiated the
Dutch debt (3rd). This closed international markets to Spanish debt. The bad
experience with royal bonds as well as the constitutional and absolutist
governments’ failure to service internal debt prevented the issuance of public
debt on the domestic market. Between 1814 and 1820, internal loans were
expensive, especially between 1816 and 1819 when the Treasury’s financing
needs were high. The Finance Minister, Martı´n de Garay, tried to address the
debt crisis following the strategy used by the Courts of Ca´diz. This restruc-
turing failed (4th), because insufficient resources were allocated to debt
redemption (the State Council vetoed disentailment) and coupon payment
(the earmarked tax revenue was small).
In 1820, public debt had grown to 14,021 million reals due to debt issues
and the fact that debt interest and arrears on the payments of public
expenditures were paid with new securities. The Liberals of the Constitu-
tional Triennium (1820-1823) tried to honour debt commitments for doc-
trinal reasons. They resorted to foreign borrowing to avoid the crowding out
of private investment. Budget deficits were funded through external debt
issues (2724 million reals). In 1823, the public debt amounted to 16,700
million reals (Comı´n 1990; Fontana 1977).
In 1823, after the second absolutist restoration, Fernando VII defaulted
(5th default) on the external debt issued by the Liberals and stopped paying
interest on domestic debt. Nonetheless, between 1824 and 1830, Fernando
VII issued 2860 million reals of external debt with high interest rates. His
Finance Minister, Lo´pez Ballesteros, restructured the debt in 1825 (6th).
Shortly afterwards, the government defaulted on Treasury expenditure
arrears in 1828, thereby creating an account’s default and were even unable
to pay the consolidated debt interest because there was no money in the Caja
de Amortizacio´n, the restored sinking fund (7th default). Another unorthodox
practice (for the liberal way of thinking of those times) was when
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TABLE 2
OUTSTANDING EPISODES IN PUBLIC DEBT MANAGEMENT IN SPAIN (1798-1988)
Government Years Defaults
1 Carlos II 1798 The Sinking Fund did not repay many
royal notes
2 Cortes de Ca´diz 1812-1813 The liberal governments could not honour
the public debt
3 Fernando VI 1814 Default on external debt and internal
debt’s interest coupons
4 Martı´n de Garay 1817 Debt restructuring failure
5 Fernando VI 1823 Default on external debt and internal
debt’s interest coupons
6 Luis Lo´pez Ballesteros 1825 Internal debt restructuring
7 Luis Lo´pez Ballesteros 1828 Default on treasury arrears and on
consolidated debt coupons
8 Conde de Toreno 1834 Restructuring of external debt and coupon
arrears consolidation
9 Isabel I 1836-1845 Default on internal debt’s interest
coupons
10 Agustı´n Ferna´ndez
Gamboa
1841 Capitalisation of accrued interest on
consolidated debt
11 Alejandro Mon 1844 Consolidation of floating debt
12 Juan Bravo Murillo 1851 Broad rescheduling of public debt
13 Manuel Garcı´a Barza-
nallana
1867 Consolidation of passive debts and
accrued coupons.
14 Sexenio democra´tico 1871 Default on interest coupons
15 Pedro Salaverrı´a 1876 Partial default on coupons and consolida-
tion of outstanding coupons
16 Juan Francisco Camacho 1881 Broad rescheduling of public debt
17 Raimando Ferna´ndez
Villaverde
1900 Broad rescheduling of public debt and 2%
debt interest tax
18 Alfonso XI 1915-1919 Inflationary tax
19 Santiago Alba 1917 Floating debt consolidation
20 Juan de la Cierva 1919 Floating debt consolidation
21 Jose´ Calvo Sotelo 1927-1928 Two floating debt consolidations
22 Joaquı´n Chapaprieta 1935 Floating debt consolidation
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Lo´pez Ballesteros managed to redeem public debt through open market
operations where he took advantage of the fact that its market price was sig-
nificantly below the face value. These irregularities committed by Lo´pez Bal-
lesteros led to the closing of the Paris stock exchange to Spanish securities. This
finance minister relaunched the Bank of San Carlos (renaming it the Bank of
San Fernando) in 1829, so as to finance the ailing Treasury (Comı´n 1995). Debt
defaults and these irregular operations explain the reduction of the accounting
value of the public debt to 5924 million reals in 1830.
3.2. Debt restructurings carried out by the first Liberals (1834-1844)
When the Liberals returned to power in 1833 after the death of Fernando
VII, they honoured all the public debts in order to initiate responsible debt
management. Nevertheless, the large level of existing debt was unsustainable
and prevented them from servicing it. Therefore, in 1834, Count of Toreno
(8th) restructured and consolidated the outstanding debt. The restructuring
affected external debt (except for the debt acknowledged to France, England
and the United States by virtue of the 1828 and 1834 treaties). Two-thirds of
the external debt was considered «active debt» while the rest was «passive
debt» on which interest would not be paid. Toreno’s restructuring worsened
the debt crisis because the 400 million real borrowing issued to implement it
had to be made with a 50 per cent discount (Piernas Hurtado 1901). Besides,
the new debt could only be serviced for a year and then coupon payments
were defaulted between 1836 and 1845 (Artola 1986, pp. 165-170). Con-
sidering this failed restructuring, the market price of the Spanish debt
dropped even more, which prevented the issue of new debt on the market
because of the enormous discounts this would have required. Default on the
debt interest from 1836 onwards worsened the debt crisis even more.
Financing the Carlist War (1833-1841) also aggravated the debt crisis.
European stock exchanges were closed to Spanish securities so the war had
to be financed with short-term loans from private financiers and the Bank of
San Fernando at very high interest rates and through other indirect compen-
sations and businesses for the financiers. The short-term debt also skyrocketed
because new securities were issued to meet the accumulation of unpaid interest
TABLE 2 (Cont.)
23 Jose´ Larraz 1939 Floating debt consolidation and
suspension of debt repayment
24 Franco Regime 1940-1950 Inflationary tax and financial repression
25 Democracy Regime 1972-1988 Inflationary tax and financial repression
Source: Comı´n (1996).
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and the delays of the Treasury in paying for the armies’ supplies. The progressive
Liberals resorted to disentailment of the church’s properties (Juan A´lvarez
Mendiza´bal in 1836) to solve the debt crisis orthodoxly, selling public assets. In
fact, Mendiza´bal’s disentailment allowed for redemption of a large part of the
public debt, the volume of which fell from 10,644 million reals to 5691 million
reals between 1834 and 1840. However, the disentailment resources were insuf-
ficient to redeem all the public debt, thereby leaving the debt crisis unsolved. In
fact, between 1836 and 1845, Isabel II’s liberal governments defaulted on internal
debt interest coupons (9th). Therefore, when the Carlist War was over in 1841,
Finance Minister Ferna´ndez Gamboa (10th) carried out another restructuring,
capitalising on the consolidated domestic and foreign debt interests due. To do
so, he handed over securities of the new consolidated debt at 3 per cent.
The political instability that followed the Carlist War generated high-
budget deficits financed with short-term loans. Consequently, the short-term
debt acquired major proportions and was serviced through some earmarked
taxes. This left the minister of finance without available resources to pay the
rest of the State’s expenditures. To free the tax earmarked for servicing the
short-term public debt, Alejandro Mon carried out a consolidation of this
sum (11th) in 1844. This debt restructuring was essential to prepare the 1845
tax reform because, before removing old taxes, Mon had to liberate them
from the government’s service of the debt. In July of 1844, Mon restructured
the debt exchanging short-term securities in consolidated bonds at 3 per cent
at the rate of exchange of 35 per cent4. Mon’s restructuring extended debt
maturity and reduced debt interests but increased the face value of debt
(1148 million over the 7673 million that existed in 1844) (Comı´n and Vallejo
2002, pp. 185-195). This compensated for the reduction of the high coupons
paid out on the borrowings used to finance the Carlist War. As part of the
rescheduling, Mon signed a cash contract with the Bank of San Fernando that
reduced the price of financing the Treasury. These measures allowed him to
meet the State’s spending and carry out the 1845 tax reform (Comı´n 2010;
Comı´n and Vallejo 2002, pp. 229-265). Nonetheless, Mon did not resolve the
structural debt crisis, which, in reality, meant permanent default. The govern-
ments had partially met the domestic debt servicing but the external debt «was
abandoned since 1835». The debt crisis was not one of illiquidity but one of
insolvency. The public debt level became unsustainable (Piernas Hurtado 1901).
3.3. A two-staged debt restructuring: Bravo Murillo and Garcı´a
Barzanallana (1851-1867)
Bravo Murillo’s broad debt restructuring (12th) was inevitable but it
contained significant defects: it was detrimental to the interests of some
4 The Treasury handed over 100 nominal reals of new debt for every 35 nominal reals of the old
debt.
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creditors, overloaded budget expenditures and raised the face value of the
public debt. The restructuring was drastic given the magnitude of the debt
crisis. The only alternative left for the minister was to declare the Treasury in
open bankruptcy, thereby defaulting on public debt. However, this did not
make up part of a Liberal finance minister’s ideology.
The general restructuring of Bravo Murillo (1851) acknowledged all
debts, even all arrears on State payments. It was good judgement to reduce
the huge variety of existing securities into two types: State (consolidated)
and Treasury (floating or short-term). The old debts, with capital discount,
were converted into the State debt while personal and material arrears
became Treasury debt. The results of the 1851 restructuring were: (a) a slight
reduction of the outstanding debt from 3900 to 3691 million pesetas and
(b) a decline of the budget debt burden both due to the decrease in interest
rates and the debt face value as well as the moratorium on payment of the
new passive debt interest. Foreign debt holders described this restructuring
as «disguised bankruptcy». The Paris stock exchange was closed to Spanish
securities. Spain ranked as an insolvent country in the international stock
exchanges (Comı´n 1988). In compensation for the discount in the face value
and the coupon reduction, Bravo Murillo offered a commitment to service
the bonds, which, before 1851, were worth almost nothing in the market.
In fact, the restructuring had not been so dramatic. Bravo Murillo only
reduced the interest rate to 33 per cent of the existing debt and he only
reduced the face value to 2.2 per cent of the debt. This explains why foreign
bondholders did not protest about the reduction in either the interest rate or
the nominal of the securities. They rejected three things: (1) reducing the
amount of due coupons to half, (2) the condition of passive debt (they would
not pay interest for some time) that would acquire part of the debt and
(3) the small budget funds that Bravo Murillo earmarked for debt redemp-
tion. The international repercussions of this restructuring arose from the
speculators’ protests — speculators who had acquired at sale price, large
amounts of the redeemable and passive debt before the rescheduling (and
therefore their coupons were due but had not yet been paid). Later the
investors pressed the Spanish State to recognise the old debts and their
due coupons for their face value. When Bravo Murillo left the government,
the foreign bondholders continued pressuring the Spanish government.
Finally, in July 1867, they got Garcı´a Barzanallana to restructure the debt to
suit them just when the next debt crisis came about.
This happened in 1866 when servicing the debt once again became
unsustainable because the figure exceeded 30 per cent of budget expendi-
tures. In July of the following year, Garcı´a de Barzanallana (13th) restruc-
tured the debt, thereby exchanging passive and redeemable securities and the
accrued coupons for consolidated debt at 3 per cent. This was exactly
what the foreign bondholders had been asking for. In fact, they accepted a
25 per cent cut in face value. The minister of finance demanded cash
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payment (raising 379 million) in exchange for the new consolidated debt.
This meant that the foreign bondholders, so wronged by Bravo Murillo, let
Barzanallana reduce the face value of the debt and extend maturity simply to
obtain consolidated bonds that paid out interest; they also admitted a 50 per
cent reduction in the nominal of the unpaid coupons — which they had
denied Bravo Murillo. Barzanallana corrected Bravo Murillo’s restructuring
but the latter had paved the way. After two restructurings, the Spanish
securities had been reduced to three types: consolidated debt at 3 per cent,
Treasury debt and Public Works debt. Moreover, they updated the State’s
liabilities and paid the bondholders regularlyyuntil the next debt crisis
arrived during the six-year democratic period.
3.4. Defaults during the six-year democratic period and Salaverrı´a’s
restructuring (1868-1876)
From 1851, budget deficits had been financed with loans from the Caja
General de Depo´sitos (General Savings Bank), issues of domestic debt and
during progressive periods, foreign borrowings. Nevertheless, public debt
grew more than the accumulated budget deficits because special securities
were issued to finance expenditure outside the ordinary budget: building
highways, subsidising the railways and compensation to city halls for the
disentailment of their land in 1855 (Comı´n 1988, 1996, pp. 158-165). Debt
servicing payments increased creating another debt crisis during the six-year
democratic period, when debt became unsustainable; in fact, since 1871, the
liberal ministers had been in default on interest coupons (14th). To restore
debt sustainability another restructuring was carried out by Salaverrı´a (15th)
in 1876. Salaverrı´a partially resumed payment of debt interest (defaulting
66 per cent of the interest of the 90 per cent of the outstanding debt for
five years). This restructuring raised the level of debt through the issue of
redeemable debt at 2 per cent to compensate the accrued and unpaid
interests. Salaverrı´a’s restructuring was an emergency solution to avoid
outright default, but it did not restore debt sustainability. In 1879, public
debt was 1.65 times the GDP and the debt burden represented 33.3 per cent
of budget expenditure (Figures 5 and 6). This level of public debt was
intolerable for the Spanish Treasury (Comı´n 1996).
4. VOLUNTARY PUBLIC DEBT RESTRUCTURING (1881-1914)
Bravo Murillo and Salaverrı´a’s restructurings were imposed on bond-
holders and the swaps of old bonds for new were compulsory. On the con-
trary, Camacho’s rescheduling was agreed with bondholders and the swap
was voluntary, because bondholders could keep their old bonds. Since then,
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this type of restructuring, which takes advantage of the market conditions to
the State’s advantage, has predominated.
4.1. Camacho’s negotiated, voluntary debt rescheduling (1881)
In view of the serious debt crisis, Finance Minister Camacho (16th)
restructured the debt to simplify the types of securities, diminish the State’s
indebtedness and reduce the debt burden. This restructuring took advantage
of the favourable market situation at the beginning of the 1880s, which
permitted a reduction of interest rates and an extension of debt maturity.
In December 1881, a law authorised the issue of 1800 million nominal
pesetas of bonds at 4 per cent (redeemable in 40 years at a discount of 20 per
cent with an interest rate of 5 per cent), to restructure some old securities
(some accepted in the swap at face value and others with a discount). Almost all
bondholders opted for the exchange. Likewise, Camacho restructured the
consolidated debt to equate its face interest rate with European securities. The
bondholders of domestic consolidated debt admitted a yield of 1.75 per cent
while foreign bondholders initially rejected Camacho’s restructuring, demand-
ing a yield of 2 per cent5. Camacho’s restructuring was successful because it
ensured that the interest payment received by bondholders would be for the
whole value. Foreign bondholders were guaranteed payment in gold.
The rescheduling was fast and complete and it restored debt sustain-
ability. Camacho’s merit was to seize the market opportunity to lower the
annual servicing of the redeemable debt (in exchange for a slight increase in
face value), and reduce the capital of the non-redeemable debt (at the
expense of a small increase in the interest rate). Camacho diminished the
level of the public debt from 13,500 million to 6800 million between 1880
and 1883; in relation to GDP, it fell from 152 per cent to 73 per cent. The
rescheduling reduced the debt burden from 33.3 per cent to 25.4 per cent
of the total budget expenditure between 1879 and 1882, but it went up to
30.4 per cent in 1883. Afterwards, public debt and its service once again
increased due to the persistence of the budget deficit, which worsened during
the war in Cuba (Figures 5 and 6). The level of the public debt stabilised at
around 7000 million pesetas after Camacho’s rescheduling. After 1895, the
war in Cuba increased the State’s borrowing and unleashed another public
debt crisis. The debt/GDP ratio was 77.7 per cent in 1890. After that, it grew
from 85.5 per cent to 127.9 per cent between 1894 and 1902. Public debt
became unsustainable once again and this new debt crisis was resolved by
Villaverde’s fiscal austerity package, tax reform and debt restructuring in
1900 (Comı´n et al. 2006).
5 The finance minister reached an agreement, thereby giving a 0.87 per cent commission to the
bondholders of external consolidated debt who opted for swapping and who paid a 50,000 pound
sterling commission to the Council of Foreign Bondholders.
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4.2. Ferna´ndez Villaverde’s debt restructuring (1900)
The cornerstone of Ferna´ndez Villaverde’s fiscal consolidation package
was the restructuring of the debt because it reduced government spending.
In 1898, the debt burden reached 43 per cent of budget spending, a figure
which was unsustainable. Hence, Villaverde (17th) restructured the public
debt with three measures: (1) the consolidation of the Treasury’s debt in
redeemable debt, with a maturity of 50 years, (2) the exchange of redeemable
debt into non-redeemable debt and (3) the establishment of a 20 per cent tax
on domestic debt interests (including the external debt that Spaniards held).
Although Villaverde preferred redeemable debt, he relinquished his own
ideas and increased the non-redeemable debt from 56 per cent to 81 per cent
between 1898 and 1907. The suspension of payback payments and the
extension of the maturity of redeemable debt were compensated by the
increase in the nominal interest rate. This initially increased debt servicing in
budget spending from 43 per cent to 46 per cent between 1898 and 1903. This
figure dropped to 28 per cent in 1914.
The novelty of Ferna´ndez Villaverde’s restructuring was the establish-
ment of the 20 per cent tax on the domestic debt interest (public debt had
previously been tax exempt), which reduced the net debt burden (interest
paid on minus tax). Villaverde’s restructuring showed that the government
could ask Spanish bondholders for more than foreign lenders. Since much of
the external debt was in Spanish hands, the finance minister asked them to
sign an affidavit to convert it into domestic debt. This meant a forfeit for
Spanish bondholders because they would no longer receive the interest
payment in gold, but in pesetas, and they would be subject to the 20 per cent
tax on debt interest. In compensation for the loss, Villaverde offered the
bondholders a commitment to service the debt and to maintain its real value
by stabilising prices and fighting inflation. Two additional factors increased
the debt burden after Villaverde’s reform: (1) the State assumed the debts
issued by Cuba and the Philippines provinces between 1899 and 1902 and
(2) the new debt securities for Villaverde’s rescheduling were issued with
appreciable premiums so as to compensate the longer maturity, which
increased the outstanding public debt.
Villaverde’s restructuring temporarily solved the debt crisis, restoring
debt sustainability. The existing public debt fell from 13,280 million pesetas
to 10,325 million between 1901 and 1914; the debt to GDP ratio diminished
from 127.9 per cent to 44.4 per cent between 1902 and 1920. As we have just
seen, the debt burden in the budget also fell. The main feature of Villaverde’s
fiscal policy was the budget surplus (1899-1908), which allowed him to pay
off the short-term debt in the Bank of Spain’s portfolio. Villaverde’s financial
orthodoxy was proved when, as Prime Minister in 1903, he presented a bill to
implant the gold standard in Spain — a bill which later failed in parliament
(Comı´n 1998, 1999; Comı´n et al. 2006).
FRANCISCO COMI´N
380 Revista de Historia Econo´mica, Journal of lberian and Latin American Economic History
4.3. Debt restructuring in the interwar period (1917-1939)
As we have seen, between 1914 and 1920, the real outstanding public debt
fell sharply due to the inflationary tax, the first relevant covert default (18th).
This new instrument of default replaced the official public debt restructurings
of the 19th century. The new formal restructurings were less frequent and more
respectful of the subscribers in the 20th century; in fact, they were mere debt
consolidations. Therefore, they were not carried out under the threat of debt
unsustainability but rather to take advantage of the favourable conditions of
the financial markets to consolidate floating debt. These restructurings were
optional: when the holders rejected swapping, the Treasury paid off the old
debt. Worthy of mention are those restructurings carried out by the following
finance ministers: Santiago Alba in 1917 (19th), Juan de la Cierva in 1919 (20th),
Jose´ Calvo Sotelo in 1927-1928, Joaquı´n Chapaprieta in 1935 and Jose´ Larraz
in 1939 (Comı´n, Martı´n Acen˜a and Martorell 2000).
In 1927, Calvo Sotelo (21st) consolidated 5225 million pesetas of Treasury
bills at 5 per cent in consolidated debt. The following year, the minister
swapped non-redeemable for redeemable debt. These restructurings were
successful in part because the new debt was exempt from the tax of 20 per
cent on the debt interest. Chapaprieta’s restructuring (22nd) took advantage
of market conditions to lower the interest rates on the public debt and to
consolidate the Treasury’s debt by extending maturity (Comı´n 1988).
In 1939, Larraz restructured (23rd) public debt to reduce interest rates; he
also suspended debt repayment until 1946. Larraz took advantage of the low
market interest rates that originated from the large monetary supply in the
post-war period. Moreover, this restructuring was prepared by the 1939
monetary policy: (a) interest rates of bank discounts at the Bank of Spain
were reduced, (b) priority was given to the new bonds for payment of cou-
pons and (c) the government assured the banks’ automatic pledging of
Treasury bonds at 90 per cent of their face value as well as exemption from
stamp duty. After the Civil War, the budget deficit was monetised once again
by printing money and pledging public debt by the Bank of Spain. Larraz’s
debt restructuring reduced the debt service burdens in the public budget
(Comı´n, Martı´n Acen˜a and Serrano Sanz 2000).
4.4. Currency debasement and inflation tax during the Franco
regime (1940-1975)
The historical experience of Spain follows the pattern revealed by Reinhart
and Rogoff (2009). When governments cannot issue foreign borrowings they
turn to the issue of domestic debt. A consequence of defaulting on external
debt in Spain was the growth of domestic debt. Governments then learned that
they could default on their domestic creditors more easily than on foreign
creditors, using two types of disguised default consisting of inflation tax and
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financial repression6. Domestic debt default through inflation was possible
when fiat money displaced coinage. The theoretical models do not explain the
paradox that governments implemented inflationary monetary policies, which
created inflation rates higher than the level that would maximise revenues by
seigniorage. Reinhart and Rogoff explained this paradox using the argument
that, by means of inflation, governments sought to reduce the real value of
domestic public debt7. By creating inflation, governments seek to finance their
budget deficits by printing money and by defaulting on domestic debt.
In 20th century Spain, the Treasury did without the defaults that had been
so protested in the previous century and instead turned to inflation tax. The
mechanisms of inflation tax were set up in 1874 when the Bank of Spain was
granted the monopoly to issue bank notes in exchange for becoming the
Treasury’s lender. Finance ministers monetised the budget deficit. This was
possible because Spain never belonged to the gold standard; what is more, as
of 1883, the peseta was no longer convertible to gold. The budget deficit
could be monetised directly. The Treasury asked the Bank of Spain for loans,
the latter carried this out by issuing bank notes and increasing the balance of
the Treasury’s current account. Bills from the Bank of Spain and the banks’
current accounts began to predominate over coins in the money supply. This
increased the country’s monetary base and therefore generated inflation and
domestic currency depreciation. Nonetheless, finance ministers did not abuse
the monetisation of the deficit except between 1895 and 1899, when the war in
Cuba was financed with short-term debt underwritten by the Bank of Spain. In
the 20th century, after World War I, Spanish governments resorted to indirect
monetisation of the budget deficit via a pledge made by the Bank of Spain to
cover the public debt, which had been underwritten by the banks. This triggered
an inflationary process that reduced the real value of the domestic debt. In
parallel, the domestic debt developed utmost importance due to the reduction of
the external debt in that same period, as we have seen. Therefore, from the end
of the 19th century on, Spain was able to use inflation tax, which substituted
debt defaults and restructurings as a way to solve debt crises. By issuing money,
the Spanish Treasury settled its financial woes and reduced real public
indebtedness. Inflation tax had three advantages for the finance ministers:
(1) the bondholders who suffered money illusion did not notice it, (2) budget
deficits could be funded more cheaply and without increasing fiscal pressure
and (3) the existing real debt and real interest rates dropped.
Inflation tax was widely used by Spanish governments from 1914 until the
1970s. In the post-Civil War period (1940-1950, 24th), it was used abusively
6 These disguised defaults are not included in the Reinhart and Rogoff series, although they are
indirectly reflected in the inflationary crisis and in banking regulation.
7 During the intense inflationary processes after the First World War (in Germany, Greece, Italy
and Norway), in the Second World War (Japan), and in the 1980s (Argentina, Brazil and The
Philippines), the magnitude of domestic public debt was at least as large as the monetary base.
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when, as we have seen, real debt interest rates were negative and real debt
value went down. Nevertheless, after the period of high inflationary tax of the
years 1972-1988 (25th), Spanish investors did not suffer from money illusion.
From then on, the government had to raise the nominal interest rate of the
State’s debt when there was inflation because the investors wanted to
maintain the real interest rate. Moreover, political democratisation and the
liberalisation of the Spanish economy from 1977 forced the government to
manage the debt responsibly.
Financial repression was another unorthodox way of financing the public
sector that avoided explicit debt crises during the Franco regime8. Financial
repression forced Spanish savers to lend to the government at below-market
interest rates via the following measures: caps on interest rates, purchases of
public debt by stated-owned banks, financial regulation requiring banks and
savings banks to hold high portfolios of public debt and tax incentives for
savers to buy bonds. The compulsory investment coefficients in public debt
and the INI bonds had forced banks and savings banks to finance public and
private investments under the Development Plans (1964-1974) (see Comı´n
and Vallejo 2009). This compulsory bank financing of extra-budgetary public
investments prevented the emergence of budget deficits and public debt
issuance in market conditions during the Franco regime. This financial
repression involved an implicit tax to be paid by depositors of banks and
savings banks that subscribed public debt, because the yields they received
were lower than those available on the market. It was a covert repudiation of
the savers’ funds (Comı´n 2007).
5. THE DEBT CRISIS DURING THE DEMOCRATIC PERIOD (1976-2012)
According to Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), Spain was one of the last
countries in Europe to graduate from serial default. This graduation took
place during democracy.
5.1. Graduation in responsible debt management during the
democratic period
At the end of the 20th century default — either outright or disguised — on
the Spanish public debt was unthinkable. Responsible public debt manage-
ment was set as a goal by the Spanish government in 1978 but it was not
actually implemented until 1987, a year after Spain became a member of the
EEC. In an initial phase (the period of political transition to democracy from
8 Financial repression was «the more subtle way of debt restructuring», according to Reinhart
and Sbrancia (2011) and it was implemented, jointly with inflation, in advanced countries between
1945 and 1980, and subsequently in emerging countries, to reduce «lofty mountains of public debt».
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1978 to 1986), financial liberalisation tried to put an end to the financial
repression that had helped to fund the government under Franco, in conditions
that were advantageous in relation to the market. During the transition to
democracy, the waiver of financial repression demanded changes in public debt
policy which had sought three goals since 1978: (1) to bring public debt issu-
ances closer to financial market conditions, (2) to place the debt between the
public and non-financial institutions and (3) to dispense with recourse of the
Treasury to the Bank of Spain funding. The first democratic governments tried
to avoid financial repression that concealed the actual financial burden of the
public budget. To create a domestic debt market, from 1978, the following
reforms were introduced: (a) debt issues were regularised and new placement
methods, such as auctions, were adopted and (b) new debt securities were
created and they were traded with new financial technologies, such as account
entries and the telephone market. Likewise, democratic governments pursued
monetary discipline by trying to finance budget deficits without resorting to
inflation tax. In the 1980s, governments tried to wean monetary policy away
from fiscal policy but they could not get rid of old budget funding habits until
1987: (1) banks and savings banks continued to be compelled to subscribe the
larger part of the public debt, (2) the Treasury continued to be financed unor-
thodoxly: loans from the Bank of Spain to the Treasury increased, the obligatory
investment ratios were increased as were the cash ratios of banks and savings
banks, (3) tax-free public debt was issued and (4) short-term public debt placed
in both public and private banks was monetised.
In fact, between 1977 and 1987, higher market interest rates led the
Treasury to resort to short-term loans from the Bank of Spain to finance
budget deficit. This increased the monetary base. To avoid excessive growth
of the monetary supply, they resorted to liquidity drains until 1982, and
afterwards to increasing the banks’ obligatory ratios (investment and cash
ratios). First, from 1977 to 1982, the Bank of Spain issued short-term debt to
offset the effects of the Bank of Spain’s loans on the money supply; this
worsened the Bank of Spain’s profits and left no monetary policy autonomy.
Second, between 1983 and 1987, they used the obligatory ratios of private
banks (financial repression) to control the money supply more effectively.
Spain’s entry into the EEC in 1986 was central to the modernisation of public
debt management. Since 1987, the objectives of Treasury funding were:
(a) implementation of the prohibition of budget deficit financing by the Bank
of Spain, established by the Treaty of the European Union, (b) extending debt
maturity while retaining a percentage of short-term debt so that the Treasury
could benefit from drops in interest rates, (c) public budget funding without
any privileges, (d) institutional and technical modernisation of the debt
market9 and (e) placing the debt among private and non-financial institutions.
9 Modernisation started in 1987 with the creation of the Account Entries System as well as the
development of the secondary public debt market (see Comı´n 1996).
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In the same line, we can highlight the following measures. Since 1989, the
gradual reduction in the compulsory investment ratio of banks in Treasury
bills began (which was 11 per cent of the bank’s liabilities). To avoid the
inflationary financing of the budget deficit by the Bank of Spain, monetary
policy independence began after Spain entered the European Monetary
System in 1989. Entering the EEC demanded free movement of capital and
membership to European monetary institutions. Therefore, in the 1990s, it
was impracticable to default on the public debt by reducing its real value
through deficit monetisation, because of Spain’s membership of the European
Monetary System and, subsequently, the Euro system, but also because of
the absence of money illusion on the part of both Spanish and foreign
investors. In summary, entering the European Monetary System brought an
end to the tradition of financing budget deficits by increasing the monetary
base by the Bank of Spain and bank underwriting of public debt at low
interest rates, because of the disappearance of the compulsory investment
ratios. Finally, the need to reduce the budget deficit/GDP ratio and to contain
the growth of the debt/GDP ratio, imposed by the monetary convergence
criteria of Maastricht, reduced the Spanish government’s fiscal autonomy,
which, since 1994, cut the budget deficit and controlled public debt growth,
achieving the goal of entering the Euro system.
5.2. The mirage of the euro and the Eurozone debt crisis
At the beginning of the 21st century, euro membership reduced the
Spanish public debt risk premium practically to zero vis-a`-vis German bonds.
Cheap credit led to enormous external indebtedness of the private sector in
Spain to finance the consumption of households and real estate investment.
Financial markets assumed that Spain lacked country risk (or that it was
as small as in Germany). The mirage lasted until the outbreak of the Greek
debt crisis in 2010 when, once again, the existence of two Europes surfaced:
rich, industrialised Central Europe and poor, peripheral South Europe.
Since the financial markets make differentiations by large regions, classified
by acronyms, Spain was immediately incorporated into the group of peripheral
European countries with a public debt crisis. When this happened, technically
there was no public debt crisis in Spain. Nonetheless, the markets associated
Spain with those countries that did indeed have a public debt crisis.
Membership of the euro exposed Spain to the contagion effect of the
peripheral countries’ public debt crisis. The Euro system put Spain under a
restrictive monetary policy, in 2011, decreed by the European Central Bank,
which would delay Spain’s exit from the economic crisis, consequently pre-
venting reduction of the public deficit. Finally, the European Central Bank’s
loans to Spanish banks were at higher interest rates that were promptly
demanded at maturity. In summary, in the autumn of 2011, the Spanish
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public debt crisis was not so much a result of the fiscal ratios as of the poor
expectations surrounding Spain’s recovery from the economic crisis, delayed
by the Euro system’s restrictive policy.
The debt crisis in Spain that began in 2010 reminds us of those that
developing countries had suffered in previous decades. It is difficult to know
a country’s safety threshold or level of tolerance (the debt/GDP ratio that
means a high risk of default on debt), but much depends on its previous
history of default on debt and inflationary processes. According to Reinhart
and Rogoff (2009), the worse the history (of being a defaulter) the less the
capacity of governments to tolerate the debt. That is, to continue borrowing
on the international markets without increasing the spreads and without
creating a crisis of confidence among investors. Although it seems like a
paradox, the countries that have a higher «debt default risk» are precisely the
ones who get most into debt on the international markets, in absolute terms,
and above all, in relation to foreign currency earnings from exports.
At the beginning of 2012, the explanation for Spain’s high public bond
spread in comparison with Germany was not the actual level of outstanding
public debt but the worsening of the economic recession and the huge needs
of recapitalisation of the country’s banking sector, whose restructuring had
been delayed with respect to other European countries. Sooner or later the
Spanish government would have to bailout the banks and savings banks,
whose assets (mortgages and public bonds) were plummeting because of the
economic crisis. The almost inevitable bank bailout would worsen the
Spanish budget deficit and more debt would have to be issued to fund it.
Unless the European Union agreed to bailout Spanish banks directly, the
scale of the situation would bring budget deficit and public debt/GDP ratios
to unsustainable levels, as had happened in Ireland in 2009. The austerity
measures imposed by the European Commission (tax rises and spending
cuts) would deepen the economic recession in Spain, deteriorating the
budget balance even more. As had happened in Greece, Portugal and Ireland,
this European restrictive fiscal policy would be self-defeating. Without eco-
nomic growth and an improvement in the competitiveness of the Spanish
economy, the level of public debt would rise and eventually the country
would need a bailout by the European Commission, the European Central
Bank and the International Monetary Fund, as had been the case of other
Eurozone peripheral countries. Only a shift in the European Commission
and European Central Bank’s fiscal and monetary policies could save the
Spanish State from falling into another deep public debt crisis (Krugman
2012; Roubini and Greene 2012; Wolf 2012).
Countries that incurred repudiations and recurrent defaults of foreign
debt acquired a greater «debt intolerance», meaning that they reached
default situations with low public debt/GDP ratios. Several defaults that took
place between 1970 and 2008 occurred in countries with an external debt
level below 60 per cent of GDP. Debt intolerance is determined by domestic
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institutional factors such as political corruption, but also by international
factors, such as the pro-cyclicality of capital flows into underdeveloped
countries. During economic crises, imports of capital stopped flowing into
developing countries, so their governments were forced to implement strict
fiscal discipline, thereby exacerbating economic depression. The reason was
that these countries could not continue borrowing to finance fiscal stimulus
policies, because international investors knew that raising budget deficits would
lead these countries, already at the threshold of public debt intolerance that
would prevent them from servicing it, to default. Therefore, according to
Reinhart and Rogoff, the international financial markets and rating agencies
question the financial solvency and ability to repay the debt of such developing
countries at debt/GDP levels well below those of advanced economies. Even
with better fiscal statistics, the international markets attribute increased default
risk to countries with poor historical records in managing debt and, therefore,
demand higher interest rates. This applies, of course, to the debt crisis of the
Eurozone peripheral countries, including Spain since 2010.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The Spanish case confirms the main hypothesis of Reinhart and Rogoff
(2009) regarding the history of public debt crisis, although they under-
estimate the number of debt crises, their duration and depth in modern
Spain. This paper highlights the following findings.
With regard to the time profile, short-term borrowing and external debt
enhanced the risk of a public debt crisis, particularly during the 19th century,
when short-term debt could not be rolled over and external debt coupons could
not be paid. In the 20th century, the situation reversed and domestic and
redeemable debts were more important, especially during the Franco regime.
In relation to debt defaults, insolvency problems arose when Spanish
governments were unable to repay the public debt or pay its coupons. Like
other countries that had incurred in serial default, Spain tended to over-
borrow, leaving the country vulnerable to debt crisis. In Spain, most outright
defaults ended up being partial defaults.
Regarding inflation tax, default through inflation became commonplace
when fiat money displaced coinage in the 20th century. Shut out from
international capital markets and facing collapsing revenues, Franco’s gov-
ernments had resorted to inflation tax and financial repression. Governments
defaulted on domestic debt through unanticipated inflation. Forced by
financial repression banks and savings banks lent a large amount of their
assets to the State, which thereby enjoyed a lower interest rate than in a
liberalised capital market.
With regard to the consequences of debt crisis, defaults endangered the
creditworthiness of the Spanish Finance Ministry. To solve debt crises,
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governments were forced to follow disciplined fiscal policies. However,
austerity measures intensified economic recessions and created a debt trap,
as has been the case since 200810.
Finally, concerning the origins, historically debt crises in Spain reflected a
rapid increase in the outstanding public debt as occurred in the politically
turbulent periods: the first half of the 19th century and various episodes between
1850 and 1940 (the progressive two-year period, the six-year democratic period,
the two Independence Wars in Cuba, the Moroccan War and the Civil War)11.
Before the democratic reforms of 1977-1978, budget revenues and public
spending were inelastic to GDP, so economic recessions did not produce debt
crisis. On the contrary, the fiscal crises of the democratic period after Franco’s
death were triggered by economic crises. Debt crises were triggered by the
establishment of the welfare state, through progressive income tax and unem-
ployment benefits. The economic recession of the 1970s was worsened by the
political transition to democracy. The 1993 and 2008 debt crises were generated
entirely by economic factors. In any case, the fiscal crisis that started in 2008 did
not become a public debt crisis until May 2010, triggered by contagion from the
Greek crisis, although the size of the Spanish debt was small.
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